

“Quick NAP” - Secure and Efficient Network Access Protocol

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
Presentation Outline

- The Problem
- Basis for a new design
- Tentative protocol proposal
- Evaluation and next steps

The Problem

Performance in Network Access (1/2)

- The attachment/movement performance of current protocol stacks is not all that great
- Attachments involve a large number of messages
- Over 50% of this is due to security
- Request/Response style, even across the Internet
- Multiple mandatory waiting periods
- New features lead to a worse situation?



Performance in Network Access (2/2)

- Much of the excess baggage is due to developing everything in separate SDOs and groups
- L2 fast handoff mechanisms exist, but do not help in all scenarios
- People are developing optimizations to, I believe, all individual parts of the shown flow
 - Will this be sufficient or do we have to collapse several functions into the same mechanisms?

Security in Network Access (1/2)

- Many known specific problems (e.g. algorithms)
 - Solvable
- Privacy protection is non-existent or incomplete
 - MAC addresses
 - Most exchanges are in the clear
 - Limitations in identity privacy support in the protocols
- Denial-of-Service problems
 - Use of cryptographic keys very late in the process
 - Attacks that create/leave state to network side elements
 - Insecure lower-layer “detach” messages

Security in Network Access (2/2)

- No security at all for the open model
- No security for related functions
 - E..g, DHCP security is not deployed
 - No security for control of firewall functions or QoS
 - Secure Neighbor Discovery could be deployed, but attacks remain
 - Why? Deploying new security credentials for these would be extremely expensive
 - Barrier for deploying new functions (e.g. FMIP)

Functionality in Network Access

- Manual processes
 - Web-logins break applications and can't be handled automatically by software
- Configuration and discovery support
 - What are the IP parameters that I can get from this access point?
 - Is my home operator available via this access point?
- Security models do not fit all types of deployment
 - Credit card payments

Ongoing Work

Ongoing Work to Address the Problems...

There is ongoing work for most of the problems:

- IP mobility
 - Optimized mobility mechanisms, e.g., new faster signaling schemes for route optimization
- Address autoconfiguration
 - IPv6 addressing speedups, e.g., Optimistic DAD
 - DHCP and SEND security
- DNA
 - Faster algorithms for detecting whether or not movement has occurred

Ongoing Work, Continued

- Link layer
 - Pre-authentication and proactive key distribution
 - Better protection of payload packets (AES etc)
 - Better information channels from the network to the clients (e.g., 802.21)
 - Bigger subnets (less IP layer work after attachment)
 - ...

Ongoing work

- Everything on previous slides is being addressed
 - People care about this and there are a lot of results!
- Most work focused on a particular “slice” of the problem
- No good understanding of what the impact of individual improvement is for efficiency
 - E.g., “I can’t afford 1 RTT in Mobile IP”
- Not enough system-level understanding of the security issues

Basis for a New Design

Approach

- Attempting to solve some of the security, functional, and performance issues
- Focus on the problem as a whole!
 - There are multiple parties involved -- not just two
 - Who needs to communicate with who?
 - How are the parties identified?
 - What is the optimal order of messages?
 - What system security properties are needed?
 - Are there bulk information transfer needs? How can they best be addressed?

Potential Solution Ingredients (1/3)

Security:

- Denial-of-Service protection
 - No separation to “attachment” and “secure attachment”
 - Stateless design on the network side
- Privacy protection
 - Build the protocols for non-static identifiers and addresses
 - Protect communications from the start, not at the end
- Uses hashes of public keys as addresses (a la CGA)
 - Avoid address stealing and functionality to bind addresses to credentials
 - Nodes can generate their addresses and keys on their own, without infrastructure -- works for ad hoc mode too!

Potential Solution Ingredients (2/3)

Protocol construction


- Message order
 - Find out what information the whole problem involves, and how many messages need to carry it and re-think message order
 - Example: If the client's IP address was known earlier, the authentication process with the home network could handle mobility-related registrations as well
- Information transfer capabilities should not be restricted to the initial authentication exchange


Potential Solution Ingredients (3/3)

Miscellaneous

- Delegation
 - Does the client have to be involved in tasks?
 - Can some tasks be delegated to the access point/router?
 - For instance, router based address assignment and DAD
 - Even a mobility related registration could be delegated

Tentative Protocol Design





Evaluation and Next Steps

Evaluation 1/2

- Significant reduction in number of messages
- No waiting periods
- Better privacy and DoS defense support
- Can be used to secure open models
- Can be used to secure other services (e.g. DHCP)
- Eliminates user intervention

Evaluation 2/2

- This may not be compatible with current protocols; likely possible only in new link layers
- Deployment needs new client - AP protocol set
 - But not AP - AAA set
 - And no new credentials
- Access devices become involved in layer 3 operations
 - But we note that this is optional
- Layer-purists might object to our views

Next Steps

- Prototyping this and variations in the Ambient Networks EU project
- Continuing with detailed protocol design
- Get measurements on benefits
- Get experience on implementation feasibility
- Feedback ideas to new link layer designs

Questions?